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INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign immunity originated in an age when the ruler, who was 
identified with the state, "was above the law" and "claims of individuals 
were sacrificed in the national interest."1 Traditionally, foreign 
immunity extended to foreign public property2 and state-owned 
commercial property,3 but not to state-owned corporate entities.4 As 
foreign governments increasingly competed in commercial activities,5 
courts sometimes extended immunity to a state-owned corporation's 
public activities,6 but not to a government's commercial activities.7 
1. Note, The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J. 1148, 
1148 (1954). 
2. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 
(1812) (granting immunity to government warship). 
3. See Berrizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (granting 
immunity in libel in rem action brought against a ship owned by Italy, but used in 
commercial trade); The Miapo, 252 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (granting immunity 
to Chilean naval ship charted by private individual for commercial purposes). 
4. See supra note 1, at 1152. See Hannes v. Kingdom of Romania Monopolies 
Inst., 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940), reh'g denied, 24 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1940), order resettled, 26 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940); United States 
v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. Cir. 1929). Under the 
separate entity rule a suit against a foreign-government owned corporation is not a suit 
against the government stockholder. Id. at 202. See infra text accompanying notes 32-
41. 
5. MICHAEL W. GORDON, Foreign State Immunity in Commercial Transactions 
§ 2.01, at 2-1 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-7 (1976) . 
6. See Dunlap v. Banco Central Del Ecuador, 41 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 
1943). 
7. See Premier S.S. Co. v. Embassy of Algeria, 336 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971); Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria Genereal de 
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 
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Such distinctions left litigants with "no firm standards" as to when a 
valid assertion of sovereign immunity was appropriate. 8 
In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act9 
(the "FSIA" or "the Act") to provide remedial procedures that would 
balance the rights of American plaintiffs against those of foreign state 
entities. 10 In general, Congress intended the Act to codify the "restric-
tive" theory11 of sovereign immunity via the commercial activity excep-
tion.12 Yet, in a departure from traditional practice the Act confers 
state status upon foreign-owned corporations, 13 unless certain excep-
tions apply. 14 
The Act grants state status upon any "agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state."15 Section 16O3(b) defines an "agency or instrumentality 
of a foreign state" as any entity: 
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a 
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign 
state or political subdivision thereof, and 
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in 
section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third 
country.16 
(1965). 
8. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7. 
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 144l(d), 1602-11 (1994) [hereinafter "the FSIA" 
or "the Act"] . 
10. "The purpose of the proposed legislation ... is to provide when and how 
parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities ... and to provide 
when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6. 
Prior to the Act there were no "comprehensive provisions" to inform parties when they 
could assert a legal claim in court against a foreign state. Id. at 7. 
11. The restrictive theory differentiates between governmental activities (jure 
imperii) and commercial activities (jure gestionis). Foreign sovereigns are immune from 
claims based onjure imperii acts whilejure gestionis acts do not generate immunity. See 
generally GORDON, supra note 5, § 4.01, at 4-3 to 4-4 (explaining the adoption of the 
restrictive theory by the State Department when making immunity request to the courts). 
The House Report states "the immunity of foreign states is 'restricted' to suits involving 
a foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and does not extend to suits based on its 
commercial or private acts (jure gestionis)." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7. See infra text 
accompanying notes 47-48. 
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). A foreign sovereignty will not be extended immunity 
if the "action is based upon a commercial activity .... " Id. 
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1033(a)-(b)(3). 
14. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1605-07. 
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) states: "(a) A 'foreign state,' except as used in section 
1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b)." 
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(l)-(3) (emphasis added). While courts have generally 
applied § 1603 to entities, they have applied it to an individual acting in an official 
capacity. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts 
have also applied § 1603 to an international organization. International Ass'n of 
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Under§ 1603(b), courts have permitted vertically removed corporations 
having "tiered" ownership interests17 to claim foreign state status. 18 
"Tiering" has allowed remote corporations competing in the commercial 
sector to gain either of two distinct advantages: immunity or the 
procedural benefits of the FSIA. 19 
Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting States, 477 F. Supp 553 (C.D. Cal 
1979), aff'd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1163 (1982). For an analysis of the FSIA as applied to international organizations, see 
Richard J. Oparil, Immunity of International Organizations in United State's Courts: 
Absolute or Restrictive, 14 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1991). 
17. Under tiering, defendant corporations trace back ownership through majority-
owned intermediaries to a foreign sovereignty. Darryl Van Duch, When Does a 
Sovereign State Control a Company?, NAT'L L.J., April 1, 1996, at Bl. Courts have 
consistently allowed "pooling," under which a defendant corporation "pools" multiple 
minority stakes of foreign governments to establish the requisite majority interest. E.g., 
LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1440 (E.D. Va. 1988). 
18. Straub v. A.P. Gren, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing fully-
owned corporation owned by "a Crown Corporation of the Province of Quebec" as an 
instrumentality of a foreign state); America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 
F.2d 793, 795-96 & n.2 (9th. Cir. 1989) (stating that foreign state definition under 
§ 1603(a) includes "wholly-owned subsidiary" owned by corporation 100% owned by 
Republic of Ireland); Allendale Mut. Ins. v. Bull Data Systems, 10 F.3d 425, 426-27 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (conferring foreign state status upon subsidiary of parent company whose 
stock was 90% owned by government of France); O'Connell Machinery Co., Inc. v. 
M.V. "Americana," 734 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 
(1984) (recognizing company as an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of Italy 
because of the Italian government's doubled-tiered stock ownership interest); Delgado 
v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (finding defendant Dead 
Sea Bromine Co. Ltd. to be an agency or instrumentality of Israel because Israel 
indirectly owned roughly two-thirds of its outstanding shares); Credit Lyonnais v. Getty 
Square Assocs., 876 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (permitting French ownership 
interests to be tiered and pooled through an intermediate entity to establish majority 
ownership); Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352, 353 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1993) 
( conferring foreign state status on corporation because of the Italian government's triple-
tiered stock ownership interest through two separate entities); Trump Taj Mahal v. 
Costuzioni Aeronautiche Geovanni, 761 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd, 958 
F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992) (recognizing defendant 
corporation as a foreign state whose link to Italian government was triple-tiered); 
Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultant, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1409, 1411-12 (D. Or. 
1990), aff'd, 937 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 903 (1992) 
(recognizing corporation that was entity of a holding company founded with the backing 
of the Peoples Republic of China as an agency or instrumentality under the FSIA); 
Rutkowski v. Occidental Chem. Corp., No. 83 C 2339, 1988 WL 107342, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 5, 1988) (conferring foreign state status on defendant Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. 
after tracing ownership through two intermediate corporations back to Canada). 
19. See infra notes 53-81 and accompanying text. 
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In Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,20 Alberta Pork, a Canadian govern-
ment supported entity, owned Fletcher's Fine Foods ("FFF''), a Canadian 
pork processing plant. FFF in tum owned Golden Gate Fresh Foods 
("GGFF"), a pork processing plant located in California. Former 
employees of GGFF brought suit relating to their termination and 
cancellation of benefits against GGFF, FFF, and Alberta Pork. Alberta 
Pork and FFF claimed immunity under § 1603. The Ninth Circuit 
became the first circuit to hold that an entity (FFF) owned by a foreign 
agency (Alberta Pork) was not entitled to FSIA protection. 
The Gates decision's importance increases as more American 
individuals and businesses encounter foreign entities. States utilize 
multitudinous ownership interests to protect national industries, promote 
commercial products, fill market voids, raise capital, and support 
political ideologies. Even with the recent popularity of privatizing 
government entities, state-owned entities continue to be "regular 
participants in commercial markets."21 The organizational matrix of 
such entities has risen in complexity and configuration. Consequently, 
tiering disputes "will become increasingly commonplace as more U.S. 
industries go global."22 Tiering, moreover, may place United States 
manufacturers at a "competitive disadvantage" if their competitors can 
get "FSIA removal and jury immunity, while they cannot."23 
This Comment argues that the language and policies of the FSIA do 
not support tiering. Part I reviews the evolution of foreign state 
immunity within the United States. Part II discusses benefits conferred 
by the FSIA and analyzes the policies supported by the Act and by the 
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. Part III discusses recent case 
developments regarding tiering, in particular the Gates decision. Part IV 
analyzes § 1603 and argues that the Gates court properly ruled against 
tiering. Part V recommends that courts should interpret the definition of 
a "foreign state" in light of the history and policies of foreign sovereign 
20. 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995). 
21. David Zaslowsky, Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments, 
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1996, at 1; see Abdullahm Al-Obaidan & Gerald W. Scully, 
Efficiency Differences Between Private and State-owned Enterprises in the International 
Petroleum Industry, 24 APPLIED ECONOMICS 237 (1992) (noting that two-thirds of 
foreign firms in the Fortune 500 list are owned wholly or in part by the state); Andrew 
Tanze, The China Bubble, FORBES, May 8, 1995, at 46 (noting that in China there are 
100,000 state-owned enterprises employing 110 million workers); Mark L. Clifford & 
Joyce Barnathan, Beijing is Buying Hong Kong-But at its Own Price, BUSINESS WEEK, 
May 13, 1996, at 64 (noting the forced share sale of a British airline to the Chinese 
government puts other companies on notice of China's "nationalization through the stock 
market"). 
22. Van Duch, supra note 17, at B 1. 
23. Id. 
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immunity. Part V also recommends that the legislature amend § 1603 
to properly implement their original purpose, the codification of the 
restrictive theory. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF lMMUNITY 
A. The Absolute Immunity Doctrine 
Within the United States, foreign sovereign immunity evolved from 
the 1812 Supreme Court case, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. 24 
The unanimous Court held that a French warship within United States 
waters was immune from libel and arrest, notwithstanding the American 
plaintiffs' claim that it had been pirated from them on the high seas.25 
Although the issue of immunity involved a government warship, Chief 
Justice Marshall acknowledged a distinction between public and private 
sovereign acts. Chief Justice Marshall stated: 
Without indicating any opinion on the question ... there is a manifest difference 
between the private property of the person who happens to be a prince, and the 
military force which supports the sovereign power, and maintains the dignity 
and independence of a nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a 
foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the 
territorial jurisdiction. . 
Nevertheless, in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro27 the Supreme 
Court quickly noted that the difference between a government warship 
24. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
25. Id. at 147. Chief Justice Marshall stated: 
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by 
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by 
placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can 
be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the 
confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, 
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be 
extended to him. 
Id. at 137. 
Sovereign Immunity, as stated by Marshall, is a voluntary waiver, for policy reasons, 
of absolute territorial power that can be withdrawn at anytime with advanced notice. 
Thomas H. Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50 
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 164-65 (1981). 
26. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145. 
27. 271 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1926). 
1821 
and merchant ship was "not of special significance."28 In the libel in 
rem action, the Court extended immunity to a commercial merchant ship 
owned by the Italian government. Thus, the Court confirmed the 
"absolute rule of state immunity."29 A foreign state and its property 
would be immune from jurisdiction, absent its consent. 30 The Court 
reasoned that a country's public acts included "advancing the trade of its 
people," "producing revenue for its treasury" and "maint[aining] and 
advanc[ing] the economic welfare of a people."31 
B. The Separate Entity Doctrine 
Twelve years after the Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court 
established the separate entity rule in Bank of the United States v. The 
Planter's Bank of Georgia,32 that state-owned corporations are discrete 
personalities that can not claim sovereign status based upon their 
sovereign owners.33 In Planters, the bank asserted that its state stock 
ownership vested Eleventh Amendment immunity rights. In refusing the 
bank's assertion, Chief Justice Marshall stated: 
The Planters' Bank of Georgia is not the State of Georgia, although the State 
holds an interest in it. It is, we think, a sound principle that when a govern-
ment becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as 
concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character . . . it 
descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself. . . . 34 
Nearly 100 years later, the New Jersey Superior Court in Molina v. 
Commission Regulardora Del Mercado De Henequen35 applied the 
separate entity doctrine in the international context. Conceptually, courts 
viewed a foreign corporation as having "its own independent juridical 
personality" whose "business and purpose was private."36 Courts 
28. Id. at 573. (statement refers to The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 116, which the Court had extensively quoted). 
29. GAMAL BOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC 
VIEW 36 (1984). 
30. Note, Sovereign Immunity of States Engaged in Commercial Activities, 65 
COLUM. L. REV. 1086, 1087 (1965). 
31. Berizzi Bros. Co., 271 U.S. at 574. 
32. 22 U.S. (Wheat) 904 (1824). 
33. See id. at 907; William C. Hoffman, The Separate Entity Rule in International 
Perspective: Should State Ownership of Corporate Shares Confer Sovereign Status for 
Immunity Purposes?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 535, 542-43 (1991). 
34. Planter's Bank, 22 U.S. at 907. 
35. Molina v. Commission Regulardora Del Mercado De Henequen, 103 A. 397, 
399 (N.J. 1918) (stating that it's a "startling" proposition that defendant corporation of 
the State of Yucatan be granted immunity). 
36. In The Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 248, 261 (D.C. Mass. 1941). 
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denied immunity to corporations closely controlled by foreign states,37 
corporations partly operating in a governmental capacity, 38 and to 
corporations that contributed to the wealth of the foreign state.39 In 
The Beaton Park,40 the court noted that foreign state-owned corpora-
tions should not be treated more favorably with respect to sovereign 
immunity than our own Govemment.41 
37. Coale v. Societe Co-Operative Suisse Des Charbons, 21 F.2d 180, 181 
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding foreign state-owned corporation not immune even though 
seven out of 17 directors were appointed by the government; the charter, amendments, 
and rules were to be approved by the government; and partial profits were paid to the 
government); United States v. Deutshes Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 200 
(S.D.N.Y. 1929) (holding corporation not immune even though it had a government 
controlled board, and France owned eleven-fifteenths of its capital stock). 
38. Deutshes Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d at 200-01 (ruling corporation 
selling potash from government mines with proceeds going to the Republic of France for 
governmental purposes not immune). "A suit against a corporation is not a suit against 
a government merely because it ... is used as a governmental agent, and its stock is 
owned solely by the government." Id. Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. International 
Sales Corp., 204 N.Y.S.2d 971, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1013 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (ruling Republic of Turkey state enterprise that contracted to 
purchase meat for the Turkish army was not performing a public act). But see Dunlap 
v. Banco Central Del Ecuador, 41 N.Y.S.2d 650, 650-52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943) (ruling 
corporation whose stock was five-elevenths owned by Ecuador government immune 
because contract in suit to mint coins was solely a public duty). 
Id. 
39. Molina, 103 A. at 399. 
40. 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. N.D. 1946). 
41. Id. at 212. 
In this country . . . when our Government enters upon an ordinary 
commercial business undertaking . . . it does so under the same liabilities as 
private individuals .... 
[N]o sound principle of law or of international comity requires that the courts 
of this country treat a foreign government more favorably as to sovereign 
immunity than our own Government is treated by the courts. 
Domestic sovereign immunity and foreign sovereign immunity are based on different 
theories. Domestic immunity originates from the impracticability of coercing the state 
into its own court. This led to the principle that the state is above the law. Hill, supra 
note 25, at 158-59. Foreign immunity emanates from principles of comity and reciprocal 
favors among countries. Ulen & Co. v. Bank of Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 24 N.Y.S.2d 
201, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940), appeal denied, 25 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1941). 
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C. The Restrictive Theory 
Courts often considered the question of immunity as a "political rather 
'than judicial matter."42 Dating back to The Schooner Exchange, the 
Executive Branch regularly made recommendations to the courts for or 
against immunity.43 Courts generally conceded to the Executive 
Branch's determination to confer immunity upon a corporation.44 
After World War II, American businesses interacted with state-owned 
entities "on a scale never dreamed of at the time of [The Schooner 
Exchange] decision."45 Americans increasingly sought the protection 
of the courts to resolve legal disputes arising from these encounters. In 
response to a suit, foreign governments often made diplomatic requests 
of immunity to the Department of State. The State Department re-
examined its approach in recommending immunity because of "the 
growing role of state agencies in international trade .... "46 In 1952, 
the Tate letter47 expressed that the State Department would employ the 
restrictive theory when making recommendations of immunity to the 
courts.48 Sovereign acts that were jure imperii (public) would be 
recommended for immunity, but jure gestionis acts (private) would not. 
42. Et Ve Batik Kurumu, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 974. 
43. The Executive department filed a request in favor of immunity. However, 
Chief Justice Marshall did not consider the request in his opinion. The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 118 (1812). In 1812, the Executive 
favored immunity because "foreign policy required amity with France in anticipation of 
warfare with its bitter enemy Great Britain." BADR, supra note 29, at 14. 
44. Et Ve Batik Kurumu, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 974. See also, F.W. Stone Engineering 
Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos of Mexico, 42 A.2d 57 (Pa. 1945) (ruling government of 
Mexico's profit generating commercial enterprise immune based upon State 
Department's recommendation). "Nor is it of any significance that the governmental 
instrumentality is a separate corporation. A determination by the Secretary of State with 
respect to the status of such instrumentality is . . . binding upon the courts of this 
country .... " Id. at 60. The Supreme Court relinquished international law in favor of 
foreign policy suggestions from the Executive Branch due to separation of powers. This 
practice reached its nadir in Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) and 
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
45. Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Trust Co., 207 F. Supp. 588, 590 (D.C.N.Y. 
1962), appeal dismissed, 313 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1963). 
46. Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197 6 
in Prospective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 303 (1986). 
47. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952) (writing from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal 
Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Philip B. Perlaman, Acting Attorney General (May 
19, 1952)). 
48. See generally GORDON, supra note 5, § 4.02, at 4-5 to 4-10 (explaining the 
evolution of State Department's determination process into a quasi-judicial hearing that 
occasionally usurped the court's function). But see Michael H. Cardozo, Sovereign 
Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REV. 608, 613-15 (1954) 
(asserting that the State Department should hold formal hearings). 
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Nevertheless, when foreign relations demanded, the State Department 
recommended immunity in disputes involving commercial acts and the 
courts abdicated.49 Courts also noted the difficulty in drawing the line 
between commercial and sovereign acts.50 The practice of deciding 
cases by either the State Department employing foreign policy consider-
ations or the courts applying international law developed "considerable 
uncertainty" for private parties.51 This bifurcated arrangement resulted 
in an "incoherent body of rules claiming legal status, but manipulated for 
political ends, and lacking essential attributes of law, such as certainty, 
generality, and neutrality."52 
II. THE FSIA: PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS AND POLICIES 
A. Procedural Protections 
The FSIA provides "comprehensive provisions" to inform parties when 
they can assert a legal claim against a foreign state.53 Previously, 
courts generally denied immunity to foreign state-owned corporations.54 
49. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (recognizing 
immunity upon State Department's recommendation on behalf of commercial vessel two 
days after Cuba released hijacked American airplane); Ibrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. 
President of India, 446 F. 2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971) (granting immunity in breach of 
contract suit pursuant to the State Department's recommendation); Chemical Nat'l 
Resource, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 215 A.2d 864, 877 (Pa. 1966) (granting 
immunity in breach of commercial contract dispute based on the State Department's 
recommendation); see also Hill, supra note 25, at 173-80 (asserting that restrictive theory 
is not closely followed in the majority of State Department decisions). 
50. See Victory Tansport, Inc. v. Comisaria Genereal de Abastecimientos y 
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1964) (noting some courts looked at the nature 
of the act, classifying those acts that could not be performed by private individuals as 
sovereign acts, while other courts examined the purpose of the act to determine if its 
objective was public in character). 
51. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 9 (1976). "The courts had begun to rely quite 
heavily on the practices and policies of the State Department and to place less emphasis 
on whether immunity was supported by the law and practice of nations, that is, 
international law." International Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting States, 477 F. Supp. 553, 565 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 649 
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). 
52. Hill, supra note 25, at 178. But see Michael H. Cardozo, Judicial Deference 
to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper, 
48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 461-62 (1963) (asserting judicial deference acknowledges the 
Executive's right and does not surrender judicial responsibilities). 
53. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6. 
54. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text. 
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The FSIA, however, presumes state-owned corporations should be 
granted immunity,55 unless an exception applies.56 Even if an excep-
tion applies, the Act, by extending sovereign status beyond the state to 
corporations under § 1603, confers sovereign procedural privileges to 
commercial entities.57 Once qualified as an "agency or instrumentality" 
under § 1603(b), the Act "provides the sole basis for obtaining 
jurisdiction . . .. "58 Therefore, tiering majority ownership back to a 
foreign sovereignty becomes the preeminent task for any indirectly state-
owned corporation. 
For a litigant who unexpectingly opposes a tiered corporation,59 the 
Act's procedural maze60 can be insurmountable.61 First, once a 
corporation establishes prima facia evidence of immunity, the burden of 
proof shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that an exception applies. 62 
55. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a)-(b)(3), 1604 (1994). 
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-07. Section 1605(a)(2) which concerns commercial 
activities is "the most significant of the FSIA's exceptions." Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 610 (1992). The most frequently raised immunity 
exception is the commercial activity exception. De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicar., 
770 F.2d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1985). The federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction 
and personal jurisdiction only if an exception applies. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b). Also, 
personal jurisdiction requires service of process in compliance with § 1608. Id. 
57. See generally Hoffman, supra note 33, at 565-84 (critiquing § 1603's 
consequences of conferring sovereign status on commercial entities and its malalignment 
with international trends). 
58. Argentine Republic v. Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989). 
59. Cf. Gould, Inc. v. Penchiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 
1988) (holding the time to determine whether a tiered corporation is a "foreign state" is 
the time of the act); but see Straub v. A.P. Gren, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(ruling FSIA applicable if tiered corporation is a "foreign state" at time suit is filed, even 
if it was not state-owned at time of alleged wrong-doing); Ocasek v. Flinkote Co., 796 
F. Supp. 362, 365 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding the time to determine whether a tiered 
corporation is a "foreign state" is the time of the suit). For changed status corporations, 
see generally Rebecca J. Simmons, Nationalized and Denationalized Commercial 
Enterprises Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2278 
(1990). 
60. See Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982) (describing the FSIA as a "labyrinth ... [with] numerous interpretive questions 
engendered by its bizarre structure and its many deliberately vague provisions .... "). 
"[T]he matrix of complex conditions has caused the FSIA to achieve the heights of 
confusion heretofore achieved only by the Internal Revenue Code." GORDON, supra note 
5, § 4.03, at 4-26. 
61. See O'Connel Machinery Co., Inc. v. M.V. "Americana," 734 F.2d 115 (2d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984) (dismissing suit because vessel immune 
from attachment under FSIA); America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 
F.2d 793, 796-800 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing suit because FSIA's commercial exception 
not applicable); Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 1270, 1287-89 
(3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1201 (1994) (dismissing two parent corporations 
from suit because commercial activity exception inapplicable). 
62. See, e.g., Gould, Inc., 853 F.2d at 451-52; H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 17 
(1976). 
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Then, the defendant entity must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the exception does not apply. 
Second, the Act provides special requirements for service of process 
upon a foreign agency or instrumentality. 63 A plaintiff who fails to 
strictly comply with the service provision carries the burden of proving 
that he "substantially complied," that the defendant received actual 
notice, and that the defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of 
compliance. 64 Delivery of the complaint in the incorrect language fails 
the "substantial compliance" test. 65 
Third, a tiered corporation gaining foreign state status can remove any 
civil action to federal comi, at any time for cause shown.66 The action 
can be removed regardless of the presence of non-diverse defendants.67 
Moreover, the Act's time limitations for removal are more liberal than 
the requirements under federal question and diversity jurisdiction. 68 
Courts have permitted untimely removal to "provide a federal forum ... 
in the interest of comity."69 One court permitted a tiered corporation 
to remove the case after four months.70 The FSIA also preempts claim-
specific federal laws that prohibit removal.71 Cases removed to federal 
court proceed without a jury.72 Every court of appeals to consider the 
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b) (1994). Requirements for service of process upon a 
foreign state or a political subdivision of a foreign state are different than the 
requirements for service upon an agency or instrumentality. Id. § 1608(a). 
64. Straub, 38 F.3d at 453-54. 
65. Id. at 453. 
66. 28 U.S.C. § 144l(d). 
67. Trump Taj Mahal v. Costuzioni Aeronautiche Geovanni, 761 F. Supp. 1143; 
1146 (D.N.J. 1991), ajf'd, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 
(1992). Removal is permissible "even if there are multiple defendants and some of these 
defendants desire not to remove the action or are citizens of the State in which the action 
has been brought." Id. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 32. 
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 
69. Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352, 355 (S.D. Tex. 1993). 
70. Id. at 354-55. See Refco, Inc. v. Galadari, 755 F. Supp. 79, 83-84 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (allowing removal after five years after limited activity in state court to effectuate 
the FSIA's policy of uniformity of law); but see Dehart v. A.C. & S., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 
792, 794-95 (D. Del. 1988) (denying removal after more than four years). 
71. Talbot, 835 F. Supp. at 355 (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) which prohibits 
removal of civil actions brought in State court under the Jones Act does not preclude 
removal by a state-owned entity under the FSIA). 
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). 
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question has held that the Act's prohibition against jury trials does not 
violate the Seventh Amendment. 73 
Fourth, plaintiffs trying to gain jurisdiction over a corporate defendant 
under the commercial activity exception face additional hurdles.74 If 
the commercial activity75 occurred within the United States, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate a nexus between the defendant's commercial activity 
and the claim.76 The claim must ·be "based upon" a commercial 
activity having "substantial contact with the United States."77 There-
fore, the nexus requirement may not be satisfied by "doing business" 
contacts under many long-arm statutes.78 If the commercial activity 
occurs outside the United States, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant's actions caused a substantial "direct effect" on the plaintiff 
and that the "direct effect" occurred in the United States.79 There must 
be an "immediate consequence of the defendant's ... activity."80 A 
corporate plaintiff who suffers "direct" financial hardship must "be 
73. Universal Consol. Cos., Inc. v. Bank of China, 35 F.3d 243, 245-46 (6th Cir. 
1994); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors, 761 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 995 (1985); Ruggiero v. Compania Pervana De Bapores "Inca Capac 
Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 875 (2d Cir. 1981); Williams v. Shipping Corp. oflndia, 653 
F.2d 875, 881-83 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Rex v. CIA. 
Pervanna De Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1981); see Jason Weedon, Note, 
Historically Immune Defendants and the 7th Amendment, 74 TEX L. REV. 655, 669-77 
(1996) (analyzing the reasoning of the circuit courts' opinions upholding the denial of 
jury trials under the FSIA). 
74. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corpora-
tions: Sovereign Immunity Part II, 85 COM. L.J. 228, 230-33 (1980) (noting the 
difficulties in interpreting and applying the commercial activity exception). 
75. A foreign state's activity is considered commercial if a private party could 
engage in a similar activity. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607,614 
(1992). 
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); America West Airlines v. GPA Group, Ltd., 
877 F.2d 793, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing case after plaintiff failed to show that 
the defendant's commercial activity was the basis of the suit); Gates v. Victor Fine 
Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1465 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995) 
( defendant Alberta Pork's acts of selling hogs and owning subsidiary umelated to former 
subsidiary employees' claims concerning termination of benefits and employment). 
77. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356 (1993) (interpreting "based upon" 
stringent! y). 
78. Gould Inc. v. Penchiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 1988). 
79. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 151-53 (2d Cir. 1991), 
ajf'd, 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
80. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. at 618. But see David E. Gohlke, Comment, Cleaning 
the Air or Muddying the Waters? Defining "a Direct Effect in the United States" Under 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 18 Hous. 
J. INT'L L. 261, 279-84 (1995) (criticizing the effect of Weltover); Sarah K. Schano, 
Note, The Scatter Remains of Sovereign Immunity for States After Republic of Argentina 
v. Weltover: Due Process Protection or Nothing, 27 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673, 697-
714 (1994) (analyzing the problems encountered by lower courts when applying 
Weltover). 
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placed in financial peril as an immediate consequence of the defendant's 
unlawful activity."81 
B. Policy Considerations 
In the seminal case The Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall 
reasoned that a domestic state voluntarily extends immunity for policy 
reasons. 82 The case law history of foreign sovereign immunity reveals 
various policy considerations. Also, the House Report concerning the 
FSIA enumerates four objectives the Act seeks to accomplish. The Act's 
legislative history reveals policies underlying these objectives. The 
policies intertwined in foreign immunity and the FSIA support recent 
case rulings prohibiting tiering. 
Foreign sovereign immunity effectuates "comity among nations and 
among the respective branches of federal government,"83 and "aid[s] in 
the maintenance of friendly powers."84 The doctrine is implemented 
so as not to "embarrass the Government of the United States in its 
foreign relations"85 and to promote "public morality, fair dealing, 
reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the 'power and dignity' of the 
foreign sovereign. "86 
The House Report states the Act would accomplish four objectives: 
"codify the . . . restrictive principle;"87 transfer sovereign immunity 
decisions "from the executive branch to the judicial branch;"88 replace 
the need for in rem jurisdiction by providing a "statutory procedure" for 
in personam jurisdiction;89 and provide prevailing plaintiffs with a 
81. Weltover, Inc., 941 F.2d at 152. The court's interpretation of the "direct 
effect" clause has created an anomaly in that corporations and individuals may succeed 
against foreign entities for commercial acts that result in financial loss, but not for acts 
resulting in personal injury. Peter Brodsky, Note, Martin v. Republic of South Africa: 
Alienating Injured Americans, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 153, 163-70 (1989). 
82. Hill, supra note 25. 
83. First Nat'l Bank v. Banco Nacional De Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972). 
84. Flota Martima Browning De Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad De La Habana, 335 
F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964). 
85. The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211, 213 (W.D. Wash. N.D. 1946). 
86. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 384 U.S. 356, 362 (1955). 
87. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 8. 
1829 
method to execute judgments against foreign states.90 These four 
objectives advance various policies. 
First, the restrictive theory, by not extending immunity to commercial 
or private acts,91 encourages private transactions with foreign states by 
ensuring individuals that their disputes will be adjudicated in the 
courts.92 This implies that findings of "commercial liability against 
foreign states do not impede the conduct of foreign relations .... "93 
Second, the Act implements "procedures that insure due process" by 
transferring immunity determinations to the judiciary.94 
Third, the Act promotes "uniformity in decision" because of the 
undesirable repercussions of inconsistent decisions in cases involving 
foreign sovereigns.95 Original federal jurisdiction,96 the expanded 
time limitations for removal,97 the lack of minimum amount in contro-
versy,98 and the prohibition of jury trials in federal court all promote 
uniformity by encouraging cases to be tried in federal court without a 
jury.99 
Synthesizing these competing concerns facilitates an analysis of 
"tiering" within the proper context. The primary policies to be balanced 
include a private litigant's right to due process versus a foreign 
sovereign's right to perform state activities free from the intrusion of a 
lawsuit. 100 Also, the transfer of immunity determinations to the courts 
and a goal of uniformity indicate a desire for predictability. Finally, the 
judiciary "should not interfere with the conduct of the foreign policy of 
the United States .... "101 
90. Id. 
91. See supra note 11. 
92. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 699 
(1976) (plurality opinion). 
93. Id. at 698. 
94. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7. The State Department "does not have the 
machinery to take evidence, to hear witnesses, or to afford appellate review." Id. at 8. 
95. Id. at 13. 
96. 28 u.s.c. § 1330 (1994). 
97. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
98. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13. 
99. Id. 
100. See Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria Genereal de Abastecimientos y 
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). 
101. Republic oflraq v. First Nat'l City Trust Co., 207 F. Supp. 588, 590 (D.C.N.Y. 
1962), appeal dismissed, 313 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1963). For an analysis of the FSIA 
within the context of separation of powers, see Todd Connors, Note, The Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act: Using Separation of Powers Analysis to Guide Judicial 
Decision-making, 26 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 203 (1994). 
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III. THE COURTS: INDIRECT OWNERSHIP OF TIERED ENTITIES 
A. Who Owns Whom 
Prior to Gates, courts have stated tiering to be "no problem"102 and 
"immaterial."103 The courts considered any "entity 50% or more of 
whose shares are owned by a foreign state is itself a foreign state."104 
Courts disregarded a parent entity's nomenclature. Consequently, courts 
applied the FSIA to any foreign government majority-owned tiered 
entity. 
Prior to Gates, the courts' analyses of whether§ 1603 permits tiering 
have lacked substance. Rather their analyses essentially concerned 
uncovering ownership interests.105 In O'Connell Machinery Co., Inc. 
v. M. V. "Americana, "106 the appellant claimed the defendant, Italian 
Line, was "too remote" under § 1603. Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale ("IRI"), an Italian government financial entity directly 
controlled Societa' Finanziaria Marittima ("FINMARE"); FINMARE in 
tum owned a majority of Italian Line's shares. 
102. Allendale Mut. Ins. v. Bull Data Systems, 10 F.3d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1993). 
103. Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352, 353 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1993). 
104. Linton v. Airbus lndustrie, 794 F. Supp. 650, 652 (S.D. Tex 1992), appeal 
dismissed, 30 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1044 (1994). In Federal 
Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993), the issue of 
tiering was not in dispute. Nevertheless, Judge Greenberg believed that a "reasonable 
inference might be drawn that the term 'foreign state' in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) does 
not include an entity which is a foreign state only because it is an agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign state." Id. at 1285 n.12. He reasoned as follows: 
Id. 
[l]t can be argued reasonably that Congress by the inclusion of "political 
subdivision" and omission of "agency or instrumentality" in section 1603(b )(2) 
intended to distinguish between these types of entities, the inference being that 
the former but not the latter could own an entity which could be regarded as 
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 
105. See, e.g, Linton, 794 F. Supp. at 652. The court found defendant Al not to be 
a foreign state because only 49.25% of majority shares were held by foreign states: two 
corporations controlled by foreign states owning 42.1 % of AI; a private corporation 
owning 20% of AI; a fourth corporation, Deutsche Airbus GmbH ("DA") owning the 
remaining 37 .9% of AI, DA in turn owned by 2 companies, 20% owned by an agency 
of the German government and 80% owned by Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm ("MBB"), 
a German corporation; foreign states owning 36.56% ofMBB and 63.44% privately held. 
106. 734 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984). 
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Whether the court considered FINMARE an agency [not explicity 
within§ 1603(b)(2)] or a political subdivison of the Italian government 
[explicity within § 1603(b)(2)] is far from clear. The court noted that 
the "Italian government saw fit to double-tier its ... agencies."107 
Without any analysis, however, the court also stated that "FINMARE fits 
comfortably within this [political subdivision] definiton."108 Without 
ever addressing the broader implications of tiering, the court simply 
traced the double-tiered state-majority interest. Thus, the court granted 
immunity to Italian Line even though the IRI "coordinate[d] the 
management of the commercial enterprises of the Italian Govem-
ment."109 
In Trump Taj Mahal v. Costruzioni Aeronautich Giovanni, 110 the 
court appropriated O'Connell's tracing of ownership reasoning. An 
Italian state agency, Ente Partecipazionie Finanziamento Industria 
Manifatturiera ("EFIM"), owned and controlled MCS S.p.A. MCS 
S.p.A. wholly owned Aviofer Breda S.p.A. who in tum owned 98.9% of 
helicopter manufacturer Augusta S.p.A., the defendant. The plaintiff 
argued that the FSIA did not apply to Augusta S.p.A. because it was 
"too remote." 
The court record stated that EFIM is a "state owned agency," MCS 
S.p.A. is a "financial operating company," and Aviofer Breda S.p.A. is 
a holding company. 111 The court, nevertheless, failed to analyze 
whether § 1603 permitted tiering by agencies and instrumentalities. 
Instead, the court analogized Augusta's position to that of Italian Line 
in O'Connell and permitted this triple-tiered arrangement. 112 
America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd. 113 illustrates the 
courts' easy extension of state privileges. In America West Airlines, the 
court noted that defendants Aerlinte and Aer Lingus, "fall within the 
definition of a 'foreign state' under section 1603(a)" because they were 
wholly owned by the Republic of Ireland.114 Without discussion the 
court then treated a subsidiary of Aer Lingus ( defendant Airmotive, an 
engine maintenance corporation) as a foreign state. 
107. Id. at 116 (emphasis added). 
108. Id. at 116-17. 
109. Id. (emphasis added). 
110. 761 F. Supp. 1143 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992). · 
111. Id. at 1149-50 (emphasis added). 
112. Id. at 1150. 
113. 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1989). 
114. Id. at 796. 
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The court's reasoning in Rutkowski v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 115 
emphasizes blind adhesion to tiering without considering the intermediate 
entity's classification. In Rutkowski, the court noted that "Quebec did 
not own more than 50 percent of [defendant] ACL."116 Yet, the court 
held ACL to be an instrumentality of Canada because Quebec wholly 
owned "a company (SNA) which owned 51.2 percent of a company 
(Mines-S.N.A.) which owned 54.6 percent of ACL," an asbestos 
supplier. 117 
B. What Owns What 
Litigants disputing an entity's immunity status clash over 
§ 1603(b)(2)'s "ownership clause."118 In Gates, the Alberta Agricul-
tural Products Marketing Council ("Council") approved regulations 
issued by Alberta Pork, a marketing agent for hog producers. The 
Council also authorized the methods and matters that Alberta Pork could 
act upon, including Alberta Pork's acquisition of FFF. Based upon the 
government Council's "active supervisory role" over Alberta Pork, the 
court concluded that Alberta Pork was a "an agency or instrumentality 
of the Province of Alberta."119 
Although Alberta Pork wholly owned FFF, the court did not grant FFF 
foreign state status because FFF was "not owned by 'aforeign state or 
political subdivision thereof . . . . "' 120 The court stated: 
115. No. 83C2339, 1988 WL 107342 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1988). 
116. Id. at *1 (emphasis added). 
117. Id. (emphasis added). 
118. Sections 1603(b)(l) and 1603(b)(3) are straightforward. See supra text 
accompanying notes 15-16. 
119. Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1460-61 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995) (emphasis added). 
120. Id. at 1461 (emphasis added). The Gates opinion did not mention two previous 
Ninth Circuit cases that permitted tiering, Straub v. A.P. Gren, Inc., 38 F.3d 448 (9th 
Cir. 1994) and America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 
1989). In Straub, defendant corporation Atlas Turner was owned by a Crown 
Corporation of the Province of Quebec. The plaintiff did not argue that tiering was 
impermissible under the Act. The plaintiff did contend that Atlas Turner was not a 
foreign state because the corporation was riot an instrumentality at the time of the acts 
giving rise to the suit. The court held that the FSIA did apply because Atlas Turner was 
acquired by a Crown Corporation prior to the time the lawsuit was filed. Straub, 38 
F.3d at 451. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14, for a discussion of America 
West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd. 
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One might argue that once we determine that Alberta Pork is an agency or 
instrumentality, then it ipso facto becomes a foreign state or political 
subdivision thereof. However, the literal language of the statute requires us to 
reject that argument .... [T]he statute [1603(a)] provides that a foreign state 
includes an agency or instrumentality, not that it is an agency or instrumentality 
or that it is defined as an agency or instrumentality . . . . If Congress had 
intended "agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state" to mean "a foreign 
state" for the purposes of section 1603, then it also would have intended a 
"political subdivision" to mean "a foreign state" because section 1603(a) defines 
a foreign state as including both "a political subdivision of a foreign state or an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."121 
The court further noted that the legislative history concerning 
§ 1603(b)(2) also distinguishes a foreign state from a political subdivi-
sion.122 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 1603(a)-
(b )(2) means that an entity whose majority interest is owned by a foreign 
state ( or a political subdivision of a foreign state) will be granted foreign 
state status, but that the FSIA will not provide protection to an entity 
whose majority interest is owned by an agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state or a political subdivision thereof. 
By distinguishing between foreign states, political subdivisions, and 
agencies and instrumentalities, the court restricted the reach of § 1603. 
The court's concern was that if an agency or instrumentality's majority 
ownership interest conferred foreign state status on an entity, then 
immunity could be granted to "any subsidiary in a corporate chain, no 
matter how far down the line .... "123 
The court in Gardiner Stone Hunter Int'l v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De 
Espana, S.A. 124 followed Gates. Spain directly owned Iberia Lineas 
Aereas de Espana, S.A. ("Iberia"). Iberia controlled an eighty-five 
percent interest in defendant Aerolineas Argentinas. The court found 
Iberia, a corporate entity, not to be a foreign state or political subdivi-
sion. In determining that Aerolineas Argentinas was owned by an 
agency or instrumentality, the court stated: "[t]he interpretation of the 
Act and its legislative history set forth by the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in Gates is straightforward and persuasive."125 Conse-
quently, Aerolineas Argentinas did not satisfy§ 1603(b)(2)'s ownership 
requirement. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Gardiner court was concerned 
about agencies and instrumentalities spreading potentially unlimited 
immunity throughout the corporate network. 
121. Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. 896 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
125. Id. at 130. 
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Following Gates, passengers' estates brought wrongful death actions 
after an airline crash near O'Hare International Airport in In re Air 
Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana ("Roselawn"). 126 They sued 
the airline and related entities in state court. Avions de Transport, 
Regional, G.I.E ("ATR"), the plane's manufacturer, removed the actions 
to federal court under § 144l(d) of the FSIA. 
ATR claimed it was a "foreign state" based upon the following 
ownership structure: Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospateiale 
("SNIA") owned fifty percent of ATR; SOGEPA owned twenty percent 
of SNIA and the French government owned one hundred percent of 
SOGEPA. The government also owned 52% of Credit Lyonnais which 
owned 17.81 % of SNIA. The French government, moreover, directly 
owned 62.16% of SNIA. Alenia owned the other fifty percent of ATR. 
Alenia was a division of Finmeccanica S.p.A. which was sixty-two 
percent owned by LR.I, a holding entity. The Italian government wholly 
owned LR.I. 127 
In Roselawn, the court explicitly rejected the Gates court's reasoning 
point by point. First, the Roselawn court noted that a foreign state 
within § 1603(a) (titled "Definitions") includes an agency or instrumen-
tality. Second, the superfluous inclusion of political· subdivisions in 
§ 1603(b)(2) did not necessarily lead to the exclusion of "agencies and 
instrumentalities" within the meaning of a foreign state. Third, the court 
noted that the legislative history concerning § 1603 states that only in 
§ 1608 does "the term 'foreign state' refer[] only to the sovereign state 
itself."128 The court believed that Congress did not intend the term 
"foreign state" in the very next section to mean only the sovereign state 
itself as the Gates court interpreted the section. Finally, the court 
asserted that judicial concern about expanding immunity down the 
corporate chain should be left to the legislature. 129 
126. 909 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Ill. 1995), ajf'd, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996). 
127. Id. at 1087. ATR also "pooled" ownership interest because neither the French 
nor Italian government owned a majority interest. Id. at 1090-93. 
128. Id. at 1095 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976)). 
129. Id. at 1094-96. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF TIERING 
A. Foreign States, Political Subdivisions, Agencies and Instru-
mentalities Within the Language of the FSIA 
The threshold question concerning the application of any FSIA 
provision is whether an entity is a foreign state as defined by § 1603. 
The FSIA applies to entities that are owned by foreign states, but it does 
not "apply to entities owned by entities which are not foreign 
states."130 Thus, the issue concerning tiering is whether an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state is a foreign state. 
Section 1603(a) defines a "'foreign state,' except as used in section 
1608 of this title, [as] includ[ing] a political subdivision of a foreign 
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in 
subsection (b)."131 Section 1603(b)(2) defines an agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign state as an entity "which is an organ of a foreign state 
or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares ... is 
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof .... "132 
Dovetailing the two definitions, a "foreign state" within § 1603(b)(2) 
apparently includes an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 
Consequently, courts have perceived majority state-owned intermediate 
companies as agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states (their parent 
companies) and as foreign states them.selves for agencies and instrumen-
talities (their subsidiaries). 133 This perception has greatly expanded 
potential im.m.unity and the Act's procedural benefits. Remote entities, 
competing in common com.m.ercial activities, can bootstrap tenuous 
stacks of ownership interests back to sovereign states. 
However, one can only equate an "agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state" with a "foreign state," as the Roselawn court did, through 
circular reasoning. An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" 
would mean any entity a majority of whose shares or other ownership 
interest is owned by an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state."134 Section 1603(b)(2) would define itself. Paring the section 
to its minim.um. shows the unreasonableness of this position. A foreign 
state would not be needed to confer foreign state status;§ 1603(b) could 
130. Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 794 F. Supp. 650, 653 (S.D. Tex. 1992), appeal 
dismissed, 30 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1044 (1994). 
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1994) (emphasis added). 
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
133. See Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995). 
134. See Roselawn, 909 F. ·Supp. at 1096. 
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be interpreted as an "agency or instrumentality of an agency or 
instrumentality." 
In addition, the phrase "or political subdivision thereof' in 
§ 1603(b)(2) indicates that agencies and instrumentalities are not foreign 
states. The conjunction "or" between "foreign state" and "political 
subdivision thereof' reasonably indicates Congress waQted to identify the 
alternative discrete groups that emanate foreign state status. 135 This 
interpretation makes the phrase "political subdivision thereof' completely 
necessary rather than superfluous. 136 In light of the underlying 
policies, the Gates approach is clearly preferred to the circular reasoning 
of the Roselawn court. 
As the Rose/awn court noted, § 1603 and the pertinent legislative 
history indicates that the word "foreign state" refers to the sovereign 
state itself only in § 1608. However, the Act itself indicates otherwise. 
The Act utilizes the terms "foreign state," "political subdivision of a 
foreign state," and "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" in 
various syntactic modes. The Act employs the term "foreign state" 
solely, 137 with references to § 1603, 138 with references to "political 
subdivisions"139 or "agencies and instrumentalities"140 or with refer-
ences to both. 141 
Section 1391(f) begins by specifically stating that the term "foreign 
state" means "a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a)."142 Section 
1391(f) contains four enumerated clauses concerning venue. On the one 
hand, § 1391(1)-(2) treats the three groups identically. Under clause 
one, the plaintiff may bring an action in any district in which "a 
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim 
occurred, or a substantial part of property that is subject of the action is 
situated."143 Under clause two, a plaintiff may bring a claim where 
"the vessel or cargo of a foreign state is situated .... "144 
135. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (6th ed. 1990). 
136. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462. 
137. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(l)-(2) & 1607. 
138. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 139l(t) & 144l(d). 
139. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(t)(4) & 1608(a). 
140. 28 u.s.c. § 1605(3) & 1606. 
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d)-(e). 
142. 28 U.S.C. § 139l(t). 
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(t)(l). 
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(t)(2). 
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On the other hand, § 1391(£)(3)-(4), treats the three groups differently. 
Section 1391(f)(3) states that a civil action may be brought "in any 
judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do 
business or is doing business .... "145 Section 1391(f)(4) states that 
a civil action may be brought "in the United States Court for the District 
of Columbia if the action is brought against a foreign state or political 
subdivision thereof "146 This clause contains the identical wording as 
the ownership clause in § 1603(b)(2). 
One should not interpret the term "foreign state" in § 1391(f)(4) as 
including "an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" because every 
word after "Columbia" would become superfluous. Furthermore, 
Congress clearly did not have this intent. The legislative history states 
that § 1391(f)(4) is limited to the foreign states and their political 
subdivisions because that is where they "have diplomatic representatives 
and where it may be easiest for them to defend."147 The only reason-
able interpretation is that the word "foreign state" means the sovereign 
state itself. Likewise, the Gates court reached a similar reasonable 
interpretation after examining an identical phrase under § 1603(b)(2). 
The Act repeatedly regards an "agency or instrumentality" less favorably 
than a "foreign state." The exception to jurisdictional immunity of a 
foreign state is more narrow than that of an agent or instrumentality 
when the issue involves "rights in property taken in violation of 
international law."148 Also, a foreign state, unlike an agency or 
instrumentality, is not liable for punitive damages. 149 Under § 1608, 
if no special arrangement exists, a plaintiff must serve a foreign state 
according to strict international standards or through diplomatic 
channels. 150 A litigant can serve an agency or instrumentality of a 
Id. 
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(t)(3). 
146. 28 u.s.c. § 1391(t)(4). 
147. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 32 (1976). 
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(3). The courts have jurisdiction over a foreign state when 
rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that 
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States 
by the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such 
property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign 
state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in 
the United States .... 
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1606. "[T]he foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and 
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a foreign state 
except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages 
.... " Id. 
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a). 
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foreign state through less formal manners. 151 Finally, a court can 
attach property used by a foreign state for a collllllercial activity if it "is 
or was used for the collllllercial activity upon which the claim is based 
• • •• " 152 However, an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state 
engaged in collllllercial activity in the United States may have its 
property attached "regardless of whether the property is or was used for 
the activity upon which the claim is based."153 
Such dissimilar treatment throughout the Act indicates the term 
"foreign state" often refers solely to the sovereign state itself. Congress 
did not intend to equate an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" 
with a sovereign state. Additionally, the legislative history concerning 
§ 1603(b)(2) states that "a majority of the entity's shares or other 
ownership interest be owned by a foreign state (or by a foreign state's 
political subdivision)."154 Because the term "political subdivision" is 
expressly used and agencies and instrumentalities generally do not have 
political subdivisions, "foreign state" as used in§ 1603(b)(2) reasonably 
means only the sovereign state itself. Therefore, an agency or instru-
mentality should derive foreign state status only from a foreign state or 
a political subdivision thereof and not from other agencies or instrumen-
talities. 
B. The Privileges of States 
Congress intended to protect foreign sovereigns engaged in public acts 
from territorial jurisdiction by enacting the FSIA. Congress further 
intended to prevent adverse foreign policy repercussions by extending 
the procedural benefits to foreign states engaged in collllllercial acts. 
However, the Act also presumes agencies and instrumentalites, regardless 
of the nature of their acts, are foreign states. Consequently, many courts 
have granted the Act's procedural benefits to tiered entities. 155 More-
over, when a plaintiff fails to meet the Act's procedural hurdles courts 
often grant immunity to tiered entities.156 Thus, the reasons for the 
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b). 
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). 
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2). 
154. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976). 
155. See supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra note 61. 
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Act's preference for expanding state privileges must be discovered to 
determine whether they currently support the Act's policies. 
Section 1603(b) is an awkward artifact of outdated American 
perceptions of organizational enterprise and government. Its 
overinclusive structural approach mistakenly attempts to eliminate 
unequal treatment among entities from various foreign states due to a 
state's internal structure of government and enterprise. 157 The vestigial 
view that juristic persons carry out state purposes resulted from the 
socialist form of state enterprise and many European countries' use of 
state corporations to rebuild after World War II. 158 However, this 
fixation on structure at the expense of function unnecessarily provides 
tiered entities privileges previously not enjoyed under customary 
international law or often even in their own countries.159 Accordingly, 
conferring state status on tiered entities does not support foreign 
sovereign immunity policies. · 
Unfortunately, courts have permitted tiering to support foreign policies 
which are inappropriate for remote entities. 160 As previously asserted, 
the courts' perception that an entity remotely emanating from the state 
represents the state itself is a fallacious view. Tiered entities mingle in 
the marketplace like private parties. Consequently, a suit upon such an 
entity would hardly acerbate a sovereignty's "national nerves."161 
Considering that the largest group of defendants under the FSIA consists 
of agents and instrumentalities, 162 "one has to search carefully for 
r 
157. See Samuel W. Bettwy, Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Foreign Governments: 
Act of State, Sovereign Immunity, and The Alien Tort Statutes, 80 AM Soc'Y lNT'L 
PROC. 221, 230 (1986). 
158. See Wolfgang Friedman, Some Impacts of Social Organization on International 
Law, 50 AM. J. lNT'L L. 475, 486 (1956). 
159. See Bettwy, supra note 157, at 230. In discussing this anomaly Mr. Feldman, 
who assisted drafting the FSIA states: "The drafters made a mistake by bringing state-
owned enterprises within the scope of the FSIA.'.' Id. 
160. Cf. Molina v. Commission Reguladora Del Mercado De Henequen, 103 A. 
397, 399 (N.J. 1918). 
The importance of preserving the immunity of sovereigns in order to preserve 
the independence of states, the obligation of a sovereign not to degrade the 
dignity of his nation by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the 
jurisdiction of another, the perfect equality and absolute independence of 
sovereigns, the common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse and 
interchange of goods and services with each other, are the underlying reasons 
for immunity of sovereigns, as stated by Chief Justice Marshall. None of these 
reasons are applicable to a commercial corporation, even though it may be a 
governmental agency. 
Id. 
161. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703-04 
(1976) (plurality opinion). 
162. GORDON, supra note 5, § 6.13, at 6-40. 
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cases where the dignity of the foreign state would be offended were 
immunity from jurisdiction to be denied."163 
C. The Rights of Private Parties 
Prior to the FSIA, courts sacrificed a private litigant's rights in the 
interest of foreign policy. While the Act proposed to balance these 
competing interests, § 1603's overinclusiveness continues to disadvan-
tage private parties. Tiering foregoes the private litigants' concerns for 
procedural justice without achieving the Act's purpose of protecting and 
benefiting only foreign sovereigns. 
Jurisdiction over a corporate entity does not confer jurisdiction over 
the state because courts exercise a presumption of separateness. An 
entity's acts will "normally" not be attributed to the sovereign state. 
Tiered entities have an undeniable independence from indirect state 
owners. In fact, an entity's independence provides critical advantages 
over government bureaucracies. The corporate structure eliminates or 
minimizes the need for direct state control. 164 Instrumentalities offer 
flexibility, market-focused management, and efficiencies. Instrumentali-
ties act like private entities, compete with private entities, and are treated 
like private entities in the marketplace. 
Plaintiffs may treat indirectly state-owned entities like private 
companies for several reasons. First, when a plaintiff encounters a 
corporation, it may not be state-owned. 165 Second, the costs to 
determine all owners may be prohibitive for low-probability events.166 
Such costs rise in a world populated with multi-layered enterprises, 
temporary strategic alliances, boundaryless companies, and outsourcing. 
Third, a plaintiff may reasonably believe an entity can be sued like other 
private parties because it is in fact a separate legal personality. Fourth, 
a plaintiff may not realize that the FSIA preempts other statutes that 
163. Id. § 1.01, at 1-3. 
164. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corpora-
tions: Sovereign Immunity Part I, 85 COM. L.J. 167, 171 (1980). 
165. See supra note 59. 
166. Efficient airline passengers will not seek out all entities involved in the 
manufacture, maintenance, and flight of their plane. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near 
Roselawn, 909 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Ill. 1995), ajf'd, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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confer jurisdiction. 167 Finally, an indirectly state-owned entity may 
initiate the encounter leaving a plaintiff no "real" choice but to transact 
with the foreign entity. 168 
In summary, courts, foreign states, and plaintiffs generally regard 
tiered entities as separate legal personalities. However, the courts' strict 
adherence to tiering, regardless of an owner's nomenclature, prohibits 
them from distinguishing between the entity and the state. Once courts 
fuse the two, foreign immunity polices override the plaintiff's concerns 
for due process and fairness. Courts, therefore, need to differentiate 
subsidiary entities from parent owners and determine whether each is a 
foreign state, political subdivision, or an agency or instrumentality. 
Prohibiting tiering by agencies and instrumentalities will prevent 
nonexistent foreign policy concerns from providing tiered entities with 
unwarranted protections to the plaintiffs' detriment. 169 
D. International Impact 
Courts treat American corporate defendants in the United States less 
favorably than tiered foreign entity co-defendants claiming state status. 
Foreign courts treat American entities acting abroad less favorably than 
American courts treat foreign entities acting here. This results from 
§ 1603(b)'s structural approach; a government's majority stock status 
confers state status. Structural based tiering places American courts at 
odds with international practices. 170
England's State Immunities Act of 1978 presumes immunity does not 
attach to separate entities. A separate entity can overcome this 
presumption by demonstrating that the act was sovereign in nature.171 
167. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA") 
determines a parent corporation's liability strictly based on stock ownership; however, 
under the FSIA there is a presumption of separateness between a parent corporation and 
its subsidiary. The FSIA preempts COBRA. Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 
1464-65 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995). See also Stephans v. 
National Distillers and Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1266, 1230-31 (2d Cir. 1995) (ruling that 
McCarran-Fergusan Act, which declares that state laws preempts inconsistent federal 
laws regarding insurance regulations, yields to the FSIA). 
168. Workers may not have any meaningful choice but to continue to work when 
a foreign entity purchases their employer. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1459. 
169. Cf Friedman, supra note 158, at 485. "[C]ourts and writers ... have all too 
often failed to recognize that the substitution of a public corporation for the government 
itself in international transactions offered an opportunity to avoid the obstacle of 
government immunity or other traditional privileges attached to government activities in 
international law." Id. 
170. See Hoffman, supra note 33, at 554-65 (noting a trend away from status in 
Western European countries). 
171. Section 14(1)(c) of the State Immunities Act of 1978 states that a "state" does 
not include "any entity (hereafter referred to as a 'separate entity') which is distinct from 
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Thus, structure is important to deny immunity while function is 
important to provide immunity. Pakistan, Singapore, and South Africa 
take a similar approach. 172 Also, Germany generally denies immunity 
to separate entities and France follows a functional approach, examining 
the act rather than the entity's structure. 173 In addition, the European 
Convention on State Immunity takes the position of non-immunity for 
separate juridical entities unless a "sovereign activity" gives rise to the 
suit. 174 
Prohibiting tiering, as the Gates court did, furthers the Act's goal of 
aligning American practices with international practices. Alignment 
establishes a base upon which a framework of uniformity, predictability, 
and cooperation in international trade and investment can take place. 
Furthermore, it promotes fairness by sacrificing the rights of plaintiffs 
in American courts no more than they would be in foreign courts. 
E. Separation of Powers 
Much has been written about the courts intrusion into foreign policy 
matters via their interpretation and application of various sections of the 
FSIA. 175 By contrast, until Gates, courts applied § 1603(a)-(b)(3) in 
a rote mechanical manner. Nevertheless, courts following the Gates' 
interpretation and application will still refrain from encroaching upon the 
the executive organs of the government of the State and capable of suing or being sued." 
Section 14(2) continues: "A separate entity is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the United Kingdom if, and only if (a) the proceedings relate to anything done by it 
in the exercise of sovereign authority .... " State Immunities Act, 1978, §§ 14(1)(c)-
(2)(a) (Eng.), reprinted in GORDON, supra note 5, at Appendix C. 
172. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREDER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
97 n.15 (1988). 
173. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 557-63; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State 
Immunity in Europe, 5 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 51, 59 (1992). 
174. Dellapenna, supra note 165, at 61. The European Convention on State 
Immunity was ratified by Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 60. 
175. See generally Jack I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-making in International 
Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L 
Bus. 461 (1993). For an analysis of how courts should implement a separation of 
powers approach when interpreting the FSIA's commercial activity exception, see 
Connors, supra note 101. 
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Executive's power. There.is no reason to suppose that tiering disputes 
will concern major foreign policy issues. 176 
However, if a tiering case involves sensitive foreign policy implica-
tions the executive can file an amicus brief along with affidavits from 
the proper state officials. Courts have thoroughly considered statements 
of interests from the Executive Branch.177 In National Petrochemical 
Co. v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 178 the Executive Branch filed a statement of 
interest requesting that NPC, a subsidiary of a wholly owned corporation 
of Iran, have access to the courts. Likewise, the Executive Department 
can provide the court with a statement of interest when foreign policy 
dictates that an indirectly owned agency or instrumentality be treated as 
a foreign state. It must be remembered, however, that Congress 
transferred immunity determinations to the judiciary to remove political 
influences. 179 
F. Domestic Impact 
Domestic immunity originates from different theoretical grounds than 
foreign immunity. 180 Nevertheless, in practice, domestic immunity 
decisions have provided guidance to some courts when they resolved 
176. See Gould, Inc. v. Penchiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(suit involving interference with employee contract and unfair competition); Gates v. 
Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995) 
(former employees suing parent company regarding termination and cancellation of 
benefits); Straub v. AP. Gren, Inc., 38 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff suing company 
for asbestos-related injuries); American West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 
F.2d 793, 7965 (9th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff claiming breach of warranty and negligence 
concerning airplane engine fire); Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. Tex. 
1993) (worker suing for damages caused by injury aboard a vessel); Trump Taj Mahal 
v. Costuzioni Aeronautiche Geovanni, 761 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd, 958 
F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992) (employer seeking recovery 
of damages stemming from employee deaths in helicopter crash from aviation entity); 
Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultant, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Or. 1990) 
(plaintiff claiming breach of contract). 
177. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1984), 
aff'd, 794 F.2d 1490, 1494-95 (11th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 801 F.2d 404 (11th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987); National Airmotive Corp. v. Government and 
State of Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401, 406 (D.D.C. 1980). One author purposes that the FSIA 
should be amended to allow the executive to intervene in cases involving transnational 
disputes, frivolous lawsuits, and those involving national security. Hill, supra note 25, 
at 202-04. 
178. National Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989) (the United States did not formally recognize 
the government of Iran at the time). 
179. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra note 41. 
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foreign immunity questions. 181 In domestic cases, courts have recog-
nized that Americans' displeasure towards government immunity has led 
Congress to regularly make United States' entities amenable to suit. 182 
Tiering ironically provides indirectly state-owned foreign entities with 
greater legal protection in U.S. courts than is given to directly-owned 
U.S. government entities. Also, foreign entities often are amenable to 
suit in their own countries. 183 Accordingly, sovereign immunity 
policies do not justify such disparate treatment. Prohibiting tiering 
would accord similar rights to plaintiffs whether they are suing an 
American government-owned entity or a foreign state-owned entity. 184 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In considering recommendations, one must keep an important point in 
mind: immunity is the exception and not the norm. Examined in this 
context, tiering presents two distinct problems. First, if a plaintiff fails 
to meet the Act's procedural hurdles a tiered entity will be granted 
immunity regardless of the nature of its activities. Second, and more 
importantly, while a remote entity will normally not be granted 
immunity because of the Act's commercial activity exception, it does 
gain the Act's procedural benefits simply because of its tiered ownership 
structure. 
This Comment proposes two recommendations. First, as long as 
§ 1603(a)-(b)(3) remains intact, courts should interpret tiering cases 
within the historical context of sovereign immunity. Second, the 
legislature should amend§ 1603(a)-(b)(3) to focus less on structure. The 
Gates and Rose/awn decisions highlight the absurdity of relying on 
tiered ownership to implement the restrictive theory. The Legislature 
should amend § 1603 to focus either on control or function. 
181. In Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211, 212 (W.D. Wash. N.D. 1946); Edlow Intern. 
Co. v. Nuklearna Electrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827, 832 (D.D.C. 1977); Ulen & Co. 
v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201, 305 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940), appeal 
denied, 25 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941). 
182. E.g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 318, 390-91 
(1939). 
183. Bettwy, supra note 157, at 230. 
184. Cf. William H. Reeves, The Foreign Sovereign Before United States Courts, 
38 FORDHAM L. REV. 455, 456 (1970) (U.S. individuals and corporations should have 
the same rights against foreign governments as it does against our own government when 
actions involve contract and tort damage). 
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A. Historical Context 
Pre-FSIA immunity history (both domestic and foreign immunity) 
reveals that courts continually refused to extend a sovereign's immunity 
to separate legal entities. The Act's legislative history also reveals that 
Congress intended to codify the restrictive theory. Under the restrictive 
theory, a defendant's acts and not its structure are determinative in 
conferring state status. In this context, one views the Gates decision not 
as an aberration, but rather in sync with legislative intent and pre-FSIA 
case law history. 
Courts need to examine tiering disputes not only with knowledge of 
the Act's applicable statutes, but also with an understanding of the 
history of immunity The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance 
of this history in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.185 The 
Supreme Court recognized that § 1603(d)'s definition of "commercial 
activity" does not in fact define the term. The Court stated that 
"[:f]ortunately ... the FSIA was not written on a clean slate."186 The 
Court then interpreted the meaning of "commercial activity" within the 
context of the restrictive theory. 
Courts should advance the restrictive theory by prohibiting tiering 
under § 1603(b). Codifying the restrictive theory is the Act's first 
objective.187 By implementing the Act, Congress did not intend to 
change immunity policy, but rather continue the policy articulated in the 
Tate letter. Unfortunately, the Act's definitional clause fixes the 
threshold question on status for agencies and instrumentalities. Yet, 
courts have recognized that Congress "has the power to decide what the 
policy of the law shall be, and ... that will should be recognized and 
obeyed."188 Courts should uphold congressional intent by reading 
§ 1603(b)(2) narrowly as the Gates court did.189 The independent and 
remote nature of tiered entities diminishes the risk of affronting the 
185. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
186. Id. at 612. 
187. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
188. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908). 
189. See Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 686-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The 
Hyatt court found neither Gates nor Rose lawn interpretations of§ 1603(b )(2) dispositive. 
Consequently, the court inferred congressional intent from the following factors: (a) the 
prevailing international rule and earlier United States cases; (b) Congress's explicit 
inclusion of entities owned by foreign states and political subdivisions; (c) a broad 
interpretation would extend state status to remote entities removed from state control; 
and (d) the substantial implications of tiering. Consequently, the court concluded that 
"Congress intended a narrow interpretation of 'agency or instrumentality,' i.e., that
corporations a majority of whose shares are owned by agencies or instrumentalities of 
foreign states are not themselves agencies or instrumentalities." Id. at 688. 
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foreign sovereignty. Tieiring reduces the likelihood that the United 
States' foreign policy and international trade interests will be embroiled 
in the action. Lacking an amendment, only agents and instrumentalities 
directly owned by sovereign states and their political subdivisions should 
be presumed to be performing acts political in nature. 
B. Structure, Control, and Function 
Section 1603(b), and tiering in particular, acts as a poor proxy for 
state control by solely focusing on structure. 190 Even for all its length, 
the Roselawn analysis breaks down into whether "the structure of 
ownership interests ... can support ... foreign state status."191 This 
Comment proposes two possible amendments to § 1603. Both attempt 
to balance the three parties' competing concerns: a plaintiff's right to 
due process and fairness, a state's right to be free from explaining the 
propriety of government activities in a foreign court, and the Executive 
Branch's interest in not only protecting· foreign relations, but also 
international trade. The amendments justify expanding state status and 
potential immunity to agencies or instrumentalities only when either the 
state closely controls the entity or the entity performs sovereign acts. 
First, Congress can amend § 1603(b)(2) to focus strictly on a 
sovereign state or a political subdivision's control over the separate 
entity. A foreign state's sovereign interest is arguably stronger in a 
closely controlled entity than in a remote entity. Also, foreign policy 
issues are arguably more intertwined with a closely controlled entity than 
with a remote entity. The Executive Branch's interests, therefore, are 
generally stronger when an entity is closely controlled than when it is 
not. Consequently, § 1603 would presume only closely controlled 
entities are sovereign states. 
Under a control approach, courts would consider ownership as only 
one criteria when determining "state status." The court took this 
190. Linking state control with shares of ownership under § 1603(b)(2) conflicts 
with U.S. views of corporate ownership. U.S. laws and passive investments tend to 
separate ownership from management control. Comment, Robert E. Benfield, Curing 
American Managerial Myopia: Can the German System of Corporate Governance Help?, 
17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 615, 619-23 (1995). 
191. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 909 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (N.D. Ill. 
1995), aff'd, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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approach in Edlow Int'l Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko. 192 The 
Edlow court provided the first interpretation of§ 1603(b)(2). The court 
looked beyond strict ownership because the defendant was located in a 
socialist country which ultimately owned all entities. The court reasoned 
that a "state's system of ownership, without more" should not be the 
sole reason to designate an entity a state agency or instrumentality.193 
The court, in not conferring state status, noted that the state did not 
subsidize, hold board seats, or manage in daily operations. 194 Like-
wise, the Gates court used a similar approach to determine that the state 
Council's "active supervisory role" over Alberta Pork qualified it as a 
state agency or instrumentality. 195 
The control approach requires that Congress provide the courts with 
clear "control" criteria. Fortunately, the courts currently utilize control 
factors when determining whether an entity is an "organ of a foreign 
state" under§ 1603(b)(2). Courts have focused on the following factors: 
(1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose; 
(2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity; 
(3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees and pays 
their salaries; 
(4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the country; 
(5) how the entity is treated under foreign state law.196 
Courts need such criteria to pursue the goals of uniformity and 
predictability. Achieving both goals would aid international commerce 
by supporting the perception of justice and the stability of transactions. 
The control approach, moreover, offers the benefit of eliminating the 
obvious non-sovereign cases from the FSIA. Commercial entities whose 
sole connection to a state is indirect stock ownership would not receive 
any sovereign protections. 
The second proposal, though more complex, would align § 1603 closer 
to the restrictive theory by implementing a functional approach. Under 
192. 441 F. Supp 827 (D.D.C. 1977). 
193. Id. at 832. But see Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 
849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In Yessenin-Volpin, the plaintiff sued Novosti, a Soviet 
information agency. Even though N ovosti was a juridical person financially responsible 
for its obligations, the court reasoned that a socialist state owns all organizations such 
as Novosti. Id. at 854. 
194. Edlow Intern. Co., 441 F. Supp. at 832. 
195. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
196. Medical Corp. v. McGonigle, No. 96-3737, 1997 WL 45039, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 31, 1997). See also Corporacion Mexicana Servicios Manitimos, S.A. DE C.V. v. 
The M/T Respect, 89 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Pemex-Refining, a 
subsidiary of Pemex, from FFF in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods because Pemex-Refining 
was 100% owned by Pemex, controlled by government appointees, employed only public 
servants, and was exclusively in charge of refining and distributing government 
property). 
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a functional approach, a tiered agency or instrumentality would receive 
only the Act's immunity protection when performing a sovereign act. 
The Act's presumption of state status would differ for directly owned 
entities than for tiered entities. Section 1603 would continue to presume 
a directly owned entity is a foreign state. The same policies supporting 
state status for closely controlled entities justify treating directly owned 
entities as foreign states; the foreign sovereign and the United States' 
interests warrant intrusion upon the private party's interest. Such entities 
and private party opponents would continue to operate under the FSIA's 
current procedural rules. A private party attempting to defeat a claim of 
immunity would have to establish a prima facia case that one of the 
Act's exceptions to immunity applies. 197 
A tiered entity, however, would no longer be presumed to be a foreign 
state under § 1603. Removing this presumption presents only a minor 
risk to affronting a state's sovereignty because tiered entities do not 
possess attributes particular to sovereign states. Their remoteness and 
independence removes the mystification of tiered entities as foreign 
states above the normal procedures of justice. There is no indication 
that suits involving tiered entities will endanger foreign policy or 
international trade interests. Consequently, a private party's interest in 
due process justifies shifting to tiered entities the costs of legal disputes 
that they create. 
Under the functional approach, a foreign agency or instrumentality 
sued in state court continues to remove the action to federal court 
pursuant to § 1441(d), the FSIA's removal clause. This enables the 
federal courts to continue to determine the ultimate immunity issue. In 
federal court, once a plaintiff, seeking to remand, establishes a prima 
facia case that the entity is "tiered," the burden shifts to the defendant 
entity. Then, a foreign entity seeking the Act's protections or immunity 
must prove either direct ownership or a sovereign act. 
To determine direct ownership, a court would decide whether an 
entity's parent is a political subdivision or an agency or instrumentali-
ty. 198 An entity would establish direct ownership by proving that the 
parent is a political subdivision. Then, the parties would continue under 
the Act's normal procedural scheme. As noted, direct ownership 
justifies the continued presumption of state status and the attendant 
197. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
198. E.g., Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 680-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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procedural benefits. However, an entity failing to prove direct owner-
ship, a tiered entity, carries the burden of proving its acts were sovereign 
in nature. 199 
Courts would continue to utilize § 16O5(a)(2), the commercial activity 
exception, when determining whether the activity in question was 
commercial or sovereign?)() A tiered entity involved in an action 
"based upon" a "commercial activity" will not receive immunity. The 
Supreme Court defined "based upon" as "those elements that, if proven, 
would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case."201 It 
requires more than a "mere connection with" the commercial activi-
ty.202 A commercial activity determination is a question of behavior 
and not motive; a court examines the type of action and not the entity's 
reasons for the action. The Supreme Court stated that when a sovereign 
acts "in the manner of a private player" within the market its acts are 
"commercial within the meaning of the FSIA."203 
199. This approach is similar to the approach taken by England's State Immunities 
Act for separate entities. See supra note 171. 
Id. 
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994) states that immunity will not be granted when 
[T]he action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United 
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon 
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct 
effect in the United States ... ·. 
201. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993). 
202. Id. at 358. 
203. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). The Court 
reasoned that the private person distinction was the meaning Congress understood the 
restrictive theory required at the time it passed the statute. Id. at 612-13. Many 
commentators have criticized the commercial activity exceptions and the Court's 
interpretation of it. See Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 
17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 499-516 (1992) (asserting that interpretations of "commercial 
activities" has lead to unpredictable results); Amelia L. McCarthy, The Commercial 
Activity Exception-Justice Demands Congress Define a Line in the Shifting Sands of 
Sovereign Immunity, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 893 (1994); Jonathan Kaiden, Millen Industries 
v. Coordination Council For North American Affairs: Unnecessarily Denying American 
Companies Right to Sue Foreign Governments Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 193 (1991); Garvey, supra note 175, at 463-74 (claiming 
courts manipulate what constitutes an "act" to conceal political motivations). But see 
Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A 
Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 302 (1986) (asserting that complex commercial 
transactions require a flexible clause and the courts have generally applied it correctly). 
Writers have proposed various changes to help guide the courts in their determination 
of the nature of an activity. E.g., McCarthy, supra, at 914-23. Under the functional 
approach, any changes to the commercial activity exception would be incorporated into 
the court's analysis when determining whether the activity was sovereign in nature. 
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Courts would grant immunity to tiered entities involved in sovereign 
acts not because of their structure, but because of the public nature of 
their acts. This approach emphasizes the activity nature of the restrictive 
theory. If a tiered entity's activities are not sovereign acts, the federal 
court would remand the action to state court. The policies justifying the 
extension of the Act's procedural benefits to directly-owned entities do 
not warrant an extension to tiered entities. 
In summary, § 1603 would continue to grant state status to directly-
owned agencies and instrumentalities, but not to tiered entities. Directly-
owned agencies or instrumentalities would continue to receive the Act's 
procedural protections and possible immunity; tiered entities, however, 
would not receive the procedural protections of the Act. Nevertheless, 
tiered entities conducting sovereign acts could obtain immunity. 
CONCLUSION 
Tiering allows the FSIA's protections to unnecessarily metastasize to 
remote entities who neither have sovereign attributes or are involved in 
sovereign acts. Tiering disputes will only increase as transactional 
effects pulse across the synapses of interconnected entities. Courts 
confronting tiering questions should not automatically equate an agency 
or instrumentality with a foreign state. The Gates court's prohibition 
against tiering was a proper interpretation of the language of 
§ 1603(b)(2). Furthermore, the ruling supports the policies of sovereign 
immunity. 
Notwithstanding the Gates ruling, the Legislature should follow the 
lead of many other countries and amend§ 1603. A control or functional 
approach would place sovereign immunity questions in line with 
international practice. Such an amendment would bring the FSIA closer 
to the restrictive theory as laid out in the Tate letter. Furthermore, the 
proposed amendments distribute the burdens and benefits in a manner 
that reflects the strength of the interests involved. 
KELLY SHAUL 
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